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SOCIAL SECURITY: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SECTOR POLICY OPTIONS FOR
THE FUTURE
Jeffrey R. Lewis*
Americans have been told for more than a decade that something
must be done to restore financial soundness to the Social Security sys-
tem.' In fact, Social Security is running out of money. In a recent staff
report to the Committee On Finance of the United States Senate, it was
stated that the actuarial forecasts of the financial condition of social
security prepared by the Board of Trustees2 have grown dramatically
worse from one report to the next. In a span of four years from 1973 to
1977, the projected long range deficit in the Social Security trust funds
jumped from 0.32% of taxable payroll, or 3 % of the expected social
security expenditures, to 8.2 % of taxable payroll, or an amount exceed-
ing 40% of the expected expenditures of the program. Moreover, in
1977, "it was estimated too that the assets of the [Disability Insurance]
Trust Fund would be exhausted by 1979, the assets of the [Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance] Trust Fund would be exhausted by the mid-
1980's, and the assets of the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund would be
exhausted by the late 1980's."' 4 Even these gloomy projections were
proved inaccurate as economic conditions have continued to worsen.5
Public opinion surveys tell us that the people, by a decisive margin,
want to preserve the goals of the system.6 Concern over the imminent
collapse of the Social Security system is not limited to those who rely
heavily or exclusively upon Social Security benefits. Those approach-
* Mr. Lewis is Legislative Assistant to Senator Robert Packwood (R-Or.). The views expressed
by the author do not necessarily reflect those of Senator Packwood.
1. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 96TH
CONG., 2D SEss., SOCIAL SECUaTY AND ECONOMIC CYCLES (Subcomm. Print 1980).
2. The Board of Trustees of the Social Security Trust Funds is made up of the Secretaries of
Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The Board is required by law to
prepare annually a thorough analysis of the acturial status of the Social Security programs
(Old-Age, Survivors, Disability, and Hospital Insurance) both over the short range and over
the long range extending well into the future. The Trustees are required to transmit these
annual reports to the Congress no later than April 1 of each year, at which time their reports
and findings as to the financial status of the funds form the benchmark for discussion and
debate of the programs. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 97TH CONG., lST SESS.,
STAFF DATA AND MATERIALS RELATED TO SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING 1 (Comm. Print
1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 FINANCING REPORT].
3. Id. See Figure 1, Social Security's Deficit, infra p. 94.
4. 1981 FINANCING REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
5. Id. at 2. See Figure 2, How Estimates Have Changed, infra p. 94.
6. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIB. OF CONG., ISSUE BRIEF No. 81-143, SOCIAL SECURITY, 1981:
PUBLIC OPINION (1981).
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ing retirement are equally concerned.7 Similarly, millions of Americans
are contributing substantial money to a system they fear may go bank-
rupt before they can reap the benefits of their labor.
8
No less disquieting to these working contributors is the difficulty, if
not the impossibility, of making both mandatory contributions to the
Social Security system and voluntary payments to a private pension
plan. If Social Security is to supplement private retirement plans, wage
earners must not be foreclosed from contributing to their private pen-
sion plans because of the high cost of Social Security taxes.
The popular belief that the problems which plague the Social Se-
curity system are the result of short-term economic conditions must be
discarded.9 The real problems are deeply rooted in the system itself.
Only by dealing with these fundamental flaws can the financial integ-
rity of the system be secured. The desire to preserve the social benefits
of the present system mandates that the government take the bold steps
necessary to reestablish the program's financial integrity.
Congress must comprehensively assess the goals of Social Security
and determine the most equitable and realistic method of achieving
those goals. In doing so, Congress must focus its attention on the sev-
eral factors which are the primary cause of the current crisis in Social
Security:
(1) the inclusion of automatic increases in benefits indexed to the
Consumer Price Index as part of the 1972 Social Security
Amendments; 10
(2) a dramatic shift in the ratio between the number of Social
Security recipients and the number of workers contributing to
the System;" and
(3) the inclusion of benefits not originally granted by the Social
Security system.
This article examines these factors and sets forth some of the
major public and private sector policy options which could, with
careful preparation, restore the system's strength.
WEAKENED FISCAL BASE
Since the 197212 and 197713 amendments to the Social Security Act,
economic assumptions upon which these amendments were based have
7. Poll Shows Americans Losing Faith in Future of Social Security System, N.Y. Times, July
17,1981, at 12, cols. 1-2.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972) (currently
codified at 42 U.S.C. §415 (i) (1976 & Supp. II 1978) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Social Secur-
ity Amendments].
11. STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 97TH CONG., 2D SESs. DEVELOPMENTS IN
AGING: 1980 REPORT (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as 1980 AGING REPORT].
12. Id.
13. Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1509 (1977).
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proven to be extraordinarily optimistic.14 It was upon these assump-
tions that Congress altered both the benefit structure and the financing
provisions of the Social Security Act. In 1972, it was estimated that the
Consumer Price index (CPI), to which benefit increase provisions were
tied, would increase at a rate of three percent per year for the first half
of the decade before phasing down to a long-term level of about 2.8%
annually. 5 However, the CPI rose by 6.2% in 1973, 11% in 1974, stabi-
lized to an average increase of just above 6.5% per year for the years
1976 through 1978, then rose by 11.5% in 1979, 13.5% in 1980 and
10.2% in 1981.16
This higher rate of increase in the CPI, due primarily to inflation,
has caused Social Security benefits to increase beyond expectation. As a
consequence, though it was assumed that approximately nine billion
dollars would be added to Social Security program revenue between
1973 and 1977,17 this period produced a seven billion dollar deficit. 8
Furthermore, the 1975 report of the Board of Trustees forecast that the
disability insurance fund would have difficulty meeting its benefit obli-
gations beginning in 1980.19 By 1978, the difficulty had already arisen.
If the 1977 amendments to the Social Security Act had not shifted reve-
nues to the fund, the program would have experienced fiscal disaster. 20
While the inflation rate has been a major contributor to current
short-term problems in Social Security, the changing population has
added to the long-range instability of the program.21 President Frank-
lin Roosevelt's 1935 Committee on Economic Security, the founders of
the Social Security program, had projected that the elderly population
would amount to 17 million, 19.1 million, and 19.3 million for the years
1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively.2 2 In fact, the Committee severely
underestimated the improved health and increasing longevity of older
Americans.3 The 1980 Census recorded 25.5 million people aged sixty-
five and older. This was a ten-fold increase from their number in 1880.
By the year 2000, it is estimated that the population sixty-five and older
will increase to at least thirty million.24
As the over sixty-five population increases, so to will increases in
14. R. S. KAPLAN, FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM; sree also REPORTS OF
THE 1975 QUADRENNIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, XV, 13-20, 89-132; R-
PORT OF THE PANEL ON SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING, 3-4; STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, OnIONS FOR FINANCING THE SOCIAL
SECURITY PROGRAM. 94TH CONG., IST SESS. (Comm. Print 1979).
15. See J. PEACHMAN, THE CRISIS IN SOCIAL SECURITY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 36 (1977).
16. 1981 FINANCING REPORT, supra note 2, at 82.
17. Id. at 81-84.
18. Id. at 83.
19. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF OLD-AGE, SURVIVORS AND DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUND,
1975 ANNUAL REPORT 29-56 (1975).
20. Id
21. J. PEACHMAN, supra note 15, at 7.
22. COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1935).
23. Id.
24. 1980 AGING REPORT, supra note 11, at 2.
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the life expectancy of the aged.25 In addition, the trend toward early
retirement is continuing.26 These factors, combined with a lower birth
rate, underscore the fundamental shift in the ratio of contributors to
Social Security to the number of recipients.27
In 1950, the ratio of workers for every recipient was 16.5 to 1.28
Since that time, the figure has drastically decreased. In 1960, the ratio
was 5.1 to 1; in 1970 it was 3.6 to 1; in 1980 it was 3.3 to 1. By the year
2030, it is projected to be only 2 to 1.29
This weakening of the financial base of the system over the past
thirty years can be demonstrated in another way. In 1950, 138.7 months
or 11.5 years worth of expenditures were on hand in the Old-Age, Sur-
vivors, and Disability Trust Funds.30 This meant that if the revenues
coming into the system had suddenly stopped, there would have been
enough assets in the trust funds to pay for 11.5 years worth of benefits
and administration. As of early 1982, only 1.8 months worth of expend-
itures were on hand.
The 1972 Social Security Amendments32 provided for an annual in-
crease in Social Security benefits. It was believed that an automatic in-
crease provision linked to increases in consumer prices would result in
benefit increases considerably lower and more closely tied to economic
circumstances than would result from Congress acting on an ad hoc
basis.3 Between February 1965, and January 1971, Congress increased
Social Security benefits by thirteen percent, fifteen percent, and ten per-
cent, substantially exceeding the twenty-seven percent rise in consumer
prices during this time. While the intent behind the indexing was laud-
able, the consequences for the fiscal health of the system were not.
ADDITIONAL BENEFICIARIES OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST
FUNDS
Since the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, the program
has grown both in terms of cost and more importantly, with regard to
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., ACTUARIAL STUDY No. 85
SOCIAL SECURITY AGE POPULATION PROJECTION, reprintedin SENATE SPEC. COMM. ON AG-
ING, REPORT No. 317, DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. vol. 1, at 1 (1981)
[hereinafter PROJECTION].
28. Kirviscusi & Zeckhauser, The Role of Social Security in Income Maintenance, in THE CRISIS
IN SOCIAL SECURITY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 41-64 (M.J. Boskin, ed. 1977).
29. PROJECTION, supra note 27.
30. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS AND DISABILITY INSUR-
ANCE TRUST FUND, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 66 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 TRUSTEE'S
REPORT].
31. Id at 109.
32. Id. See 1972 Social Security Amendments, supra note 10, at 42.
33. Prior to the passage of the 1972 amendments which established an annual cost-of-living ad-
justment (COLA) and tied to the C.P.I., Congress would grant Social Security recipients a
COLA for whatever amount they deemed necessary and reasonable.
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the types of persons who are eligible for benefits. 34 Given the financial
instability that confronts the system many of the features of the pro-
gram added after 1938 should be reevaluated, and possibly terminated.
Some of the major and minor benefit improvements made in the last
few decades illustrate the unrealistic attitude that has prevailed in Con-
gress during that period.
Disability Benefits
In the early 1950's Congress amended the Social Security Act to
create a program to provide cash benefits to severely disabled work-
ers.35 The disability program went into effect in 1956. In 1958, coverage
was extended to the dependents of disabled workers. The purpose of
the extension was to minimize the reduction or loss of benefits suffered
by certain older workers who, because they became disabled prior to
reaching retirement age, had periods of reduced or no earnings in-
cluded in their records for purposes of computing retirement benefits.36
The disability program was designed to be funded out of a Social
Security trust fund, as was the retirement program. Thereafter the Dis-
ability Insurance Trust Fund was integrated into the Social Security
system. Congress increased the Social Security tax to offset any costs
that would result from the new program. The Senate Finance Commit-
tee and the House Ways and Means Committee intended that the pro-
gram be financed through this increase in the Social Security tax and
not funded out of general revenues.37 As noted above, this has not been
the case recently.
The disability program has cost $129 billion since it began.38 Disso-
lution of the Disability Insurance Trust Fund might provide sufficient
funds to stave off the current financial problems. Any such change,
however, should be considered as only one of many possible structural
changes. 39 In retrospect, perhaps this program should have been
viewed more as a welfare program and, therefore, been based on an
individuals income rather than on participation in Social Security.
Student Benefits
In 1965, Congress amended the Social Security Act to make eligible
for benefits those students who are unmarried and the dependent of
someone who is either deceased, receiving disability benefits, or receiv-
34. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIB. OF CONG., ISSUE BRIEF No. 80-127, SOCIAL SECURITY BENE-
FITS, CASH RELIEF AND FOOD AID: A SHORT HISTORY (1980).
35. Id. at 7.
36. Id.
37. See Speech by Senator Robert Packwood to Portland, Oregon senior citizens group (October
1980).
38. Soc. Sec. Admin., U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 45 Soc. SEC. BULL. 43 (1982).
Figure is for the period 1957 to 1981.




ing old-age or survivors benefits under Social Security.' The Senate
Finance Committee believed that a "child over age 18 who is attending
school full-time is dependent and that it is not realistic to stop such a
child's benefit at age 18." The Committee expected that a child "may
be prevented from going to college by loss of parental support and loss
of his benefits; he may even be prevented from finishing school."4
Since 1965, this new provision alone has resulted in a seventeen billion
dollar expenditure from the trust funds.42 Under terms of the recently
enacted Budget Reconciliation bill, however, this provision will be
phased out over the next four years.43
Transitionally Insured
In 1965, an individual must have had a minimum of six quarters of
coverage to be eligible for Social Security benefits.' During debate on
the 1965 Social Security amendments, an amendment was added in
both the House and Senate bills to provide retirement benefits for peo-
ple "who reached retirement age in 1954, 1955, or 1956, if they had one
quarter of coverage for each year that elapsed after 1950 and up to
1954." 41 This new provision required only three quarters of coverage
rather than six, as under current law at that time, to be eligible for
retirement benefits.
Prouty Benefits
The Tax Adjustment Act of 196646 included an amendment pro-
posed by Senator Winston L. Prouty (R-Vt.) which guaranteed Social
Security benefits for certain uninsured individuals. Senator Prouty be-
lieved that the many hundreds of thousands of seniors aged sixty-five
and older who, because the system did not permit them to participate,
had no quarters of coverage should not be excluded from retirement
benefits. 47 The Senator's intention was to provide blanket coverage
under the Social Security program for all those age seventy and older
not otherwise eligible for Social Security under a program of minimum
benefits.48 This amendment guaranteed that any person who had at-
tained age seventy-two before 1968 would be eligible for Social Secur-
ity benefits.49
40. Id See also supra note 34 at 6.
41. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 89TH CoNG.,IsT Sass. 96-97 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as 1965 SENATE REPORT].
42. 44 Soc. SEC. BULL. 16 (1980).
43. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981).
44. The Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965).
45. 1965 SENATE REPORT, supra note 41, at 105.
46. Tax Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-368, 80 Stat. 38 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Tax
Act of 1966].
47. 112 CONG. REC. 5,289-90 (1966).
48. Id.
49. Tax Act of 1966, supra note 46.
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Disabled Widows Benefits
Prior to 1967, Social Security benefits for widows and widowers
were not provided on the basis of disability." In 1967, the Social Secur-
ity program was further expanded to provide Social Security benefits
for certain totally disabled widows, including surviving divorced wives,
and totally disabled dependent widowers.-" This liberalization of the
program allowed for monthly benefits to be provided to widows and
dependent widowers who became totally disabled before or within
seven years after a spouse's death or, in the case of a widow, before or
within seven years after the end of her entitlement to mother's bene-
fits. 2 The benefits provided to disabled widows and dependent widow-




Having examined the actions which have contributed to the eco-
nomic instability of the Social Security program, this section will set
forth public sector policy options geared to solve the program's current
and future financial problems.
The public sector changes that will be discussed have a two-fold
purpose: to achieve changes in the Social Security program that will
result in much-needed savings, and to do so in a way which does not
affect present or future elderly or disabled recipients. This listing is not
exhaustive. The intent is to suggest both short-term strategies that will
not disrupt the retirement plans of those who are now in retirement or
approaching retirement, and long-term structural changes that would
be beneficial to both the financial stability of the system and to the
economy.
Modifications to COLA Indexing
In 1938, Congress established the first indexing program when it
tied agriculture support prices to the ratio of the index of prices paid by
farmers to the index of prices received by farmers.54 More than three
decades later, Congress added indexing to the Social Security program
as one of the provisions of the 1972 Social Security Act amendments.
5
As enacted, Social Security benefits were to be adjusted to compensate
for increases in the "cost of living" as measured by the CPI.
56
50. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248 §104, 81 Stat. 821 (1967) (amend-
ing 42 U.S.C. §402 (e) & (f)).
51. Tax Act of 1966, supra note 46.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Price Adjustment Act of 1938, ch. 554, tit. V, § 501, 52 Stat. 819 (1938), repealed by ch. 792,
tit. IV, § 414, 63 Stat. 1057 (1949).




Gross cost increases in the Social Security program because of in-
dexing have caused the current 1982 cost to be 285% greater than the
1978 gross cost.57 Furthermore, the added cost of automatic benefit
increases is estimated by the Social Security Administration to have
been over sixteen billion dollars in 1980 and over fifteen billion dollars
in 1981.58 The July, 1982, boost is estimated to cost over eleven billion
dollars on an annual basis.59 While inflation itself may be the culprit,
the institutionalization of that inflation in the Social Security program
through automatic cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) is a major cause
of the system's short-term problems. Therefore, Congress should con-
sider modifying the automatic COLA increase in attempting to allevi-
ate the short-term financial problems of the system. Modifying the
automatic COLA is the fairest and most nondisruptive way of dealing
with the problem through benefit curtailments.
Though there has been a great deal of discussion as to whether the
CPI is too heavily weighted with respect to housing cost increases,
60
there is no consensus on this issue. Many organizations representing the
elderly have stated that the index understates the impact of inflation on
Social Security recipients and should be increased rather than de-
creased.61 It is probable, though, that annual savings in the multi-bil-
lion dollar range could be achieved by adjusting the method by which
the CPI is calculated to eliminate the distortions created by housing
cost increases.62
Several other suggested modifications of indexing meet the two cri-
teria of easing the program's financial problems but in a fair and non-
disruptive way. When a Social Security recipient first becomes eligible
at age sixty-two, his or her benefits are indexed for changes in the cost-
of-living in that year and each year thereafter without regard to
whether or not he or she has actually filed for benefits.63 These benefit
increases will eventually be reflected in the benefits they receive when
they do file.
This means that a person who turned sixty-five and began receiving
benefits in January, 1981, received an eleven percent COLA increase in
July, 1981, and was on the benefit roster for the entire year. The person
who, on the other hand, turned sixty-five and retired in December,
57. PROJECTION, supra note 27.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Changes in the Consumer Price Index: Hearings Before Subcomm on Census and Population of
the House Comm. on Post Office and CiUil Ser. 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (testimony by
Janet Norwood, Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics); see also Hearings Before
Task Force on Indexing Entitlements and Uncontrollables of the House Comm on the Budget,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1981) (testimony of Alice Rivlin, Director, Congressional Budget
Office).
61. Id. (testimony by the American Association of Retired Persons, National Retired Teachers
Association).
62. 128 CONG. REC. S5320, S5323 (daily ed. May 14, 1982) (statement by Senator Ernest Hol-
lings, D-S.C.).
63. 42 U.S.C. §415 (i) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
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1981, was on the benefit roster for only one month of that calendar
year, but, nonetheless, his initial benefit will reflect the entire COLA
increase given that previous July.
One approach to modifying the COLA along the above lines would
be to delay the COLA increase for the first year a recipient enters the
program. In other words, if a recipient entered the program any time
during 1981, he or she would not receive a COLA increase until the
following year. This change would result in an estimated savings of
$400 million in fiscal year 1982, and a cumulative savings of $6.1 bil-
lion by 1986f 4
An alternative to denying a COLA for the first year a recipient en-
ters the program would be to pro-rate COLA increases based upon the
number of months in which the worker was eligible prior to receiving
benefits. Such a procedure would prevent gaming the system by timing
retirement so as to reap the greatest advantages from benefit increases.
The change would result in an estimated savings of $400 million in
fiscal year 1983, and a cumulative savings of $3.9 billion by 1986.65
A third possibility would be to change the base upon which the
COLA increase is calculated. Under present law, a Social Security re-
cipient receives a COLA increase each year which is added to the ini-
tial monthly benefit, thereby compounding the benefit amount and
increasing the base upon which the next COLA increase is calculated.66
Thus, if a person retired with a monthly benefit of $600 in January,
1981, and received a COLA increase of eleven percent in July, 1981, his
new benefit amount would be $666. If in July, 1982, the COLA increase
is figured at ten percent, this increase would be applied to his new ben-
efit amount, not the original $600. In other words, the original $666
monthly benefit plus a ten percent increase, or $732.60 per month.
An alternative is to calculate all of the recipients COLA increases
on the base amount of $600 with which he started, rather than on the
annually compounded base. Such a proposal would work as follows:
Retirement monthly amount $600
1981 cost-of-living increase 11%
New monthly amount $666
1982 cost-of-living increase 10% x $600=$60
New monthly award using base
amount calculation: $666 + $60 = $726
Instituting this approach would result in a fiscal year 1983 savings of
$300 million and cumulative savings of thirteen billion dollars by fiscal
year 1986.67
The fourth alternative proposal would be to change the date a re-
cipient receives his annual COLA increase and align the increase with
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §415 (i) (1) (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
67. Supra note 41.
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the federal fiscal year. Under current law, each recipient receives his
COLA in July.68 This proposal would change the date from July to
October. To ease the shift during the first year of this change, recipients
would receive a partial COLA increase in May and the remainder in
October. If this change were implemented, it would result in fiscal year
1983 savings of $1.8 billion and a cumulative savings of $6.1 billion by
fiscal year 1986.69
The fifth, and most fundamental COLA modification, would be to
align the level of benefit increase to the solvency of the system. COLA
would remain the policy objective, but only to the extent possible with-
out causing financial imbalance within the system. If, for instance, the
reserves over an upcoming two or three years would be expected to fall
below fifteen to twenty percent, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services would be required to promulgate a COLA increase that would
keep the reserves at, or about, the fifteen to twenty percent level. In
other words, less than a full COLA increase would be provided to keep
the system solvent.
Revenue Producing Measures
So far, our discussion has focused on the benefits side. Policy
changes which would result in some basic income-producing measures
cannot be ignored. There are three possibilities. The first alternative is
to increase the payroll tax rate, the route by which contributions come
into the Social Security trust funds. Under current law, workers and
employees pay a Social Security tax rate of 6.7% in 1982.70 Congress
could avoid reducing or recalculating a person's Social Security benefit
by increasing the tax rate from 6.7% to 7.05% beginning in 1983.71
A second alternative is to immediately expand the taxable wage
base. Under current law, taxes are levied on a wage base of up to
$32,400 in 1982.72 However, the wage base subject to taxation is sched-
uled to escalate to $46,800 by 1987.7 1 If this escalation were accelerated,
it would result in an immediate increase in the amount of revenue com-
ing into the Social Security trust funds. It is important to remember,
though, that while this alternative would bring in increased revenues to
alleviate the program's short-term problem, it would also increase the
amount of benefits due to people when they retire.
A public sector alternative, already partially in force, is to allow for
68. 42 U.S.C. §415 (i).
69. Supra note 41.
70. I.R.C. §§ 3101(a) and 3111(a) (1976).
71. This means that the Congress could require an increase in the social security tax, and by
doing so, avoid reducing an individual's monthly retirement benefit.
72. See supra note 70.
73. 1982 TRUSTEES' REPORT, supra note 30, table A-15, Projections of index futures of the Pro-
gram, 1983-87; and CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. LiB. OF CONG., REPORT No. 82-75EPW,
SUMMARY OF THE 1982 SOCIAL SECURITY TRUSTEES REPORT AND SUPPLEMENTARY His-
TORICAL INFORMATION 35 (1982) (prepared by David A. Koitz, Specialist in Social Legisla-
tion, Education and Public Welfare Division, C.R.S.).
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short-term interfund borrowing. As part of the bill to restore the Social
Security "minimum benefit," Congress authorized funds to be shifted
from the Health Insurance or Disability Insurance Trust Funds to the
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund to provide for continuing
benefits through June 1983. 74 Congress could extend the interfund bor-
rowing authority or reallocate the tax revenue entering the three funds.
However, such action would only postpone the final reckoning until
sometime in 1984.71
As for the long-term problems of the system, there are two basic
approaches which Congress could take. The long-term problems of the
system are primarily a function of changing demographics.76 The baby
boom of the post World War II years portends a "senior boom" by the
end of this century. With the falling birth rates of the last decade, there
will be fewer workers per retired person in the years ahead. As indi-
cated earlier, while there are now 3.2 workers paying into the Social
Security system to support one retiree,77 that ratio is projected to fall to
2.0 workers per retiree by 2030.78
With fewer workers, less taxes will be paid into the system at just
the time when more beneficiaries will seek Social Security benefits.
Congress must deal with this problem through some form of financial
restructuring of the system. Contrary to earlier proposals, Congress
generally agrees that the necessary changes must be gradually intro-
duced to allow Americans adequate time to plan for their retirement.
Concurrently, the system must have more built-in flexibility so as to
better withstand any future economic downturns. Since benefit in-
creases are linked to COLA rates, continuing high inflation will trans-
late into burgeoning payments to beneficiaries.79 It is estimated that for
every one percent rise in the inflation rate, benefit payments will in-
crease by $1.6 billion. 0 Moreover, in times of stagfiation, with lagging
wage increases and persistently high unemployment, payroll tax reve-
nues entering the system do not keep pace with benefit payments.
Changing certain COLA provisions could provide the necessary
flexibility in the system and should allow the build-up of sufficient
reserves to counter the next century's changing demography. However,
Congress must ensure in any restructuring that those recipients most
dependent on Social Security checks for their income are protected. In
1979, 3.6 million older Americans were below the poverty line 81 and
almost a quarter of the elderly had incomes of only 125% of the official
74. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, 22 U.S.C. §2201 (1980).
75. Id.
76. Speech by Senator Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.) before the U.S. Senate (Feb. 5, 1981).
77. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEr. OF LABOR, OLD-AGE, SURVIVORS AND DISABILITY INSUR-
ANCE BENEFITS (OASDI) TRUSTEES' REPORT (1981).
78. Id.
79. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
80. See 1981 FINANCING REPORT, supra note 2, at 23.
81. See 1982 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 30.
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poverty level.8 2 While Social Security is not a welfare program, those
recipients with low incomes and benefits must be protected from the
ravages of inflation through such off-setting provisions as the COLA
components in Social Security.
The first approach is to gradually raise the retirement age from
sixty-five to sixty-eight over the next ten to twenty years. Actuaries re-
port that people are living longer now than when the program first be-
gan. This trend is likely to continue.83 Naturally, raising the retirement
age could be viewed as a "financial" solution, one that creates greater
equity between generations. Yet, this is a step that each individual
should be permitted to choose for himself.
The second approach is to make the Social Security benefit formula
less generous in the future. Technically, this could be done in many
ways. In contrast to raising the retirement age, this proposal would af-
fect all beneficiaries, including disabled survivors. It would be an
across-the-board measure under which the pain would be shared
equally. In so doing, the amount of reduction will be relatively small
and not imposed on any single group of beneficiaries. In the long run,
however, this would diminish the overall adequacy of Social Security
benefits.
PRIVATE SECTOR OPTIONS
During the last decade, Americans have been given the opportunity
to prepare for retirement through such devices as Individual Retire-
ment Accounts (IRA). 4 IRAs have given some individuals an incen-
tive to prepare for their retirement. This approach acknowledges the
fact that Social Security will never be able to meet their full economic
need in retirement.
As a consequence, one of the most interesting private sector options
is to allow those individuals who could afford to do so to establish a
Social Security Option Account (SSOA).85 This approach has been de-
veloped by the INA corporation.8 6 A SSOA would be similar to an
IRA. However, it would allow recipients to contribute up to $6,000 an-
nually, whereas an IRA limits the annual contribution to $2,000. Under
the SSOA plan, each individual who pays Social Security taxes would
be allowed to contribute up to $6,000 annually. For each contribution
of $1,000, an individual would forfeit one-half percent of Social Secur-
ity benefits. For those persons who contribute the maximum amount,
the yearly forfeiture rate would be three percent. Furthermore, persons
participating in this program would be eligible for tax deductions of up
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Saul TowardA More Secure Retirement: The Social Security Option Account, NATL J., June
20, 1981, at 1139-41.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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to twenty percent of the amount of income subject to Social Security
taxes.
CONCLUSION
The problem which must be addressed is simple: the Social Security
is running out of funds. Action must be taken to ensure that the system
remains fiscally solvent. This article has outlined the options available
to alleviate both the current and long-term deficiencies of the Social
Security program. A realistic approach has been offered through each
of the alternatives suggested. Congress must now decide which one to
choose.
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